Between Sept. 17 and 18, a series of Israeli-linked explosions took place across Lebanon and Syria. These explosions by Israel were different from the infamous bombing raids across Gaza. Instead, they involved walkie-talkies and pagers connected to the Lebanese political and militant group Hezbollah.
The first wave of explosions kicked off on the afternoon of the Sept. 17, mainly targeting pagers. The results were devastating, killing 12 people and over 2,700 injured, mainly civilians.
The next day, a second series of detonations targeting walkie-talkies occurred, resulting in 30 deaths and over 750 people injured.
While this operation has been justified in the name of combating violence and terror from Hezbollah, Israel has engaged in the same kind of terror they claim to so vehemently oppose.
The origins of the attack began several months ago. In February, now-deceased Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah instituted a “low-tech” policy, under which the organization was to begin using devices like pagers to communicate. The decision was made in an attempt to evade ever more sophisticated Israeli security incursions into Hezbollah’s operations.
According to ABC, Israel was able to inject these communications devices with explosive material through a Hungarian shell company, which Israeli intelligence operated in secret.
It is important to acknowledge a few factors when considering the legality of such an attach and how it constitutes a form of terrorism.
Israel is a party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which is a United Nations treaty that prohibits the use of “booby-traps or other devices in the form of apparently harmless portable objects which are specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material.” Remotely detonated pagers and walkie-talkies would certainly fall under this designation.
Hezbollah is internationally known, first and foremost, as a militant organization, but this is only one aspect of their organization.
Hezbollah can essentially be broken down into three distinct elements: military, political, and social. The group maintains a strong fighting force, leads a 61-seat coalition in Lebanon’s parliament, and operates an extensive network of social organizations.
Such social organizations include hospitals, schools and infrastructure development companies. Though separate, all three are well integrated into Hezbollah’s command structure.
Once the pagers were distributed, they would inevitably end up in the hands of many non-militant civilians working in Hezbollah’s various organs, and it’s reasonable to assume Israel was aware of how the pagers would be spread.
It is not unreasonable to deduce that civilians were diliberately targetted in the attack given that many of the individuals in possession of these devices were part of social organizations in Hezbollah, completely seperated from any fighting force. Targeting people who are not in a direct fighting force is illegal under international law.
Another key element of this attack was the effect it had on civilian bystanders. The risk to nearby civilian life was something that simply could not have been accurately calculated, as those who were given the pagers weren’t in Hezbullah’s active fighting force, but rather regular people who consistently contributed to and interacted with their respective communities.
Because of the nature of this attack, Israeli intelligence would’ve had no way of verifying exactly who had the devices at the time of detonation, evidenced by the deaths of two children in the explosions.
Throughout the operation, more than 3,500 people were injured, with reports of lost limbs or other body parts all too common.
One of the defining characteristics of terrorism is the fear that it engenders in the population it targets, and fear is exactly what gripped the Lebanese people in the wake of these attacks.
Following Israel’s pager operation, the people of Lebanon, having just witnessed a series of handheld devices maim and kill many of their compatriots, began to dread even their portable technology.
According to The Independent, people in Lebanon were afraid to use common devices like cell phones and laptops, anticipating that a third wave of these attacks would occur. In this, Israel created a type of fear that no airstrike could.
With this attack, Israel has opened the door to future global civilian risk, as its actions will likely serve as a blueprint for years to come.
